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NOTES
THE COLUMBIA STEEL CASE: NEW LIGHT ON OLD
ANTITRUST PROBLEMS*;
IT is an old paradox in the law of antitrust that, while A and B may not
agree to fix prices, A may be permitted to acquire B, thereby eliminating
competition even more effectively than under a price-fixing arrangement.
The inhibiting force of the Sherman Act has, until recently, operated far
more stringently against loose associations than against close-knit combina-
tions. Only lately has there been a successful series of attacks on the elimi-
nation of competitive forces through the concentration of highly integrated
enterprises. A series of cases-Alcoa, American Tobacco, Paramount, Schine,
and Griffith-has now established the doctrine that a degree of market con-
trol which gives the power to exclude competition or to fix prices is illegal,
regardless of whether that power has actually been exercised or whether
any "specific intent" to violate the antitrust laws can be shown.' Various
commentators have hailed the emergence of a "new" Sherman Act, whose
legal prohibitions are based on economic reality.
2
But in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 3 the first trial of strength for
the "new" Sherman Act against corporate aggrandizement through merger,
the Government's case was rejected by the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision.
This result raises grave questions as to the efficacy in combatting mergers of
the body of doctrine described as the "new" Sherman Act.
The facts of the case-and some facts outside the case-are of central
importance.
During the war, United States Steel Corporation built and operated for
the Government a large rolled steel plant at Geneva, Utah. The plant's
average annual output capacity was 1,200,000 tons. At the close of the war,
* United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
1. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (con-
trol of 90% of virgin aluminum ingot production illegal as monopoly under § 2) ; Ameri-
can Tobacco Company v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (power to exclude competi-
tion rather than actual exclusion is test of illegality) ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948) and Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (use of
monopoly power as leverage for obtaining advantages over independent competitors is il-
legal restraint of trade); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)
(remedy for possession and use of illegal monopoly power may be divestiture).
2. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instnment of Progress, 14 U. or
Cmi. L. REv. 567 (1947) ; Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?
43 ILL. L. Rav. 745 (1949) ; Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. or Cmi. L.
REv. 153 (1947).
For a critical appraisal of the new trend, see Adelman, Effective Conipetition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. Rey. 1289 (1948). See also Wood, The Supreme Court
and a Changing Antitrust Concept, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 309 (1949).
3. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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the Government sought a purchaser for the Geneva plant. U. S. Steel con-
sidered submitting a bid, but decided against it "because of the speculative
nature of the venture and attacks by people within and without the govern-
ment." 4 But under pressure from the Surplus Property Administrator, the
Steel Corporation reconsidered its decision and submitted a bid which the
War Assets Administration accepted. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney
General advised the Administrator that the purchase of Geneva by U. S.
Steel did not violate the antitrust laws. His opinion placed great reliance on
the Alcoa case and Judge Learned Hand's dictum that, while 90% of indus-
try capacity would constitute monopoly, 64% was doubtful and 331 cer-
tainly would not.5 The Attorney General concluded that the Geneva pur-
chase, which would raise U. S. Steel's ingot output from 31.4% to 32.7% of
national capacity, would not be objectionable.!
U. S. Steel now desired to assure itself of a West Coast market for Geneva's
rolled steel output. Purchase of Consolidated Steel, the largest independent
steel fabricator on the West Coast, offered that assurance. Impetus for the
sale seems to have come originally from Consolidated's own president.
U. S. Steel postponed the deal until completion of the Geneva sale. There-
after, U. S. Steel, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, the Columbia Steel
Co., arranged to buy the assets of Consolidated for $8,250,000. The an-
nounced purpose of the transaction was to give U. S. Steel a market for a
substantial part of Geneva's rolled steel output. The deal represented a
forward integration of West Coast facilities by U. S. Steel.
After the sale was announced, the Government brought suit to enjoin its
consummation under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
These facts, without more, show the great difficulty under which the
Government labored in making its case. In effect, the Government had to
contend that the sale of Consolidated to U. S. Steel would unreasonably
restrain trade and tend toward monopoly while the sale of Geneva had not.
Furthermore, the purchase of Consolidated was designed to complement the
Geneva transaction, which had received the Attorney General's non. obsfat.
In view of these undisputed facts, any appraisal of the result in Colurmia
Steel must take into account the quasi-estoppel element interposed by the
Geneva deal and its relation to the Consolidated purchase. That it bulked
large in the Court's determination is suggested by the prominence given the
Geneva transaction in the Court's statement of facts. It could have been
ignored. But by placing the Consolidated purchase in close relation to the
Geneva deal, the Court virtually foreclosed the Government from vinning
4. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 503 (1948), quoting almost
verbatim Brief of Appellees Columbia Steel Co. et al., p. 10.
5. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 14S F2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945), supra note 1.
6. Letter from the Attorney General to the Administrator, War Assets Administra-
tion, June 17, 1946. Record on Appeal 679, 682.
7. 334 U.S. 495, 503-7 (1948).
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the case. In that sense, all other elements of the decision, doctrinally in-
triguing though they are, cannot be considered crucial for purposes of this
case. Their significance, which may be considerable, lies in the light which
they shed on recurrent problems in the field of antitrust.
Geography and Technology-The Problem of Market Definition
As the necessary first step, the Court was faced with the problem of
defining the relevant market in which the putative injury to competition
had occurred. Two distinct types of injury were alleged. First, the Govern-
ment charged that the Consolidated purchase deprived producers of rolled
steel other than U. S. Steel of a market for their product. Second, it was
alleged that the acquisition eliminated competition between U. S. and Con-
solidated in the sale of fabricated steel products.
The elimination of Consolidated as a purchaser of rolled steel in the com-
petitive market may be characterized as vertical integration. Its legality
was disputed in terms of sharply differing market criteria. The Steel Cor-
poration maintained that, since rolled steel is sold on a nation-wide basis,
the entire national market should be the yardstick. Consolidated's pur-
chases were only a fraction of one per cent of the total rolled steel sales in
the country, obviously an insignificant amount.8 The Government, on the
other hand, contended that the relevant market was the market for plates
and shapes (the types of rolled steel which Consolidated used) in the eleven-
state Western area in which Consolidated sold its fabricated steel. Con-
solidated's purchases amounted to thirteen per cent of the market, so de-
fined.9 The Court accepted the geographic but rejected the technological
narrowing of the market for which the Government contended. Holding
that it did not appear that other forms of rolled steel might not easily be
produced instead of plates and shapes, -the trial court found-and the
Supreme Court agreed-that the relevant market was the total sale of rolled
steel in Consolidated's eleven-state area.1" Of that market, Consolidated
accounted for three per cent of rolled steel purchases.1
The Court was more favorable to the Government in defining Consoli-
dated's share of the fabricated steel market for purposes of testing the effect
of eliminating competition between Consolidated and U. S. in the sale of
fabricated steel-the horizontal integration. Resolving technological ques-
tions of the similarity between U. S.'s and Consolidated's structural fabrica-
tions in the Government's favor, the Court agreed that Consolidated-again
in the eleven-state market-accounted for eleven per cent of the structural
steel sales."2
8. 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948).
9. Id. at 509.
10. Id. at 511.
11. Id. at 508-9.
12. Id. at 512-3.
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Long-range significance attaches to this perpetuation of the Court's recent
tendency narrowly to define the market wherein illegal control is alleged."3
Clearly, the narrower the market, the easier it is to show an illegal degree of
control. The Court's careful consideration not only of the market's geo-
graphical scope, but also of its delimitation in terms of technical factors of
product similarity, suggests that this important factor of proof will continue
to be made easy for antitrust plaintiffs.
Vertical Integration-The Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
The Government's principal line of attack was aimed at the vertical
integration which foreclosed Consolidated as a market for the competitive
sale of rolled steel. Competition for Consolidated's rolled steel purchases
was not thereby restricted; it was wiped out. And the Government con-
tended that this point alone was sufficient to make its case.
The Government's contention placed primary reliance on the recent
Yellow Cab case.' 4 There, a taxicab manufacturing company foreclosed its
operating affiliate as a market for taxicabs produced by other manufacturers.
Coloring the case was the existence of unpleasant practices, including the
fixing of a price above market for the defendant's cabs. The allegations of
the complaint were held to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act.15
That decision, the Government said, was authority for the proposition that
the removal of a buyer from the competitive market is a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, without reference to the amount of the market
thereby controlled. By deeming illegal the insulation of a small part of the
taxicab market from competitive selling, Yelhl, Cab, in the Government's
view, made such vertical integration illegal per se."1
Rejection of the Government's contention resulted in acceptance of the
paradox of differing standards of illegality for integrated combinations and
loose associations. The Associated Press case had held that a concerted re-
fusal by members of the principal news-gathering association to sell the
association's product to non-members was illegal per se.'7 While the court
13. E.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (market for taxicabs
in four cities) ; Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948) (market for sugar beets in small area of California).
14. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
15. The Government appealed the granting of defendent's motion to dismiss a com-
plaint alleging violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The alleged violations
arose from the activities of a vertically integrated company which forced its operating sub-
sidiary to purchase only cabs of its own manufacture, thereby e-xcluding the competition
of other taxicab manufacturers. The Supreme Court held, in reversing the trial court, that
the alleged exclusion of competitors was not insulated from the Sherman Act simply be-
cause the defendant was a vertically integrated enterprise.
16. 334 U.S. 495, 521 (1948).
17. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild Association v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (boycott against retailers who sold
pirated dress designs held illegal per se).
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might have predicated that holding on the unique nature of the product
involved, it did not do so. Instead it purposefully used most generalized
language. The lesson of Associated Press was not related to the problem of
free communication."8 It spoke for free trade.
Now, despite an explicit disclaimer entered by the Court in the Paramount
case,19 the Government contended that the leap from boycotts by loose
associations to exclusion by integration was completed by the Yellow Cab
case. 0 Consequently, elimination of a buyer or seller from the competitive
market by vertical integration is, without more, an illegal restraint of trade.
The Court had a very practical reason for disagreeing with this contention.
In effect, to decide otherwise would have been to hold that all exclusive
dealing arrangements are illegal per se.
Can General Motors designate one agent in a town to sell its cars? Can
Rexall exclude all but one brand of drugs from its counters? A negative
answer seems incredible; yet, because the Government's view was to some
extent supported by the language of the case, the Court felt constrained to
deny with great vigor that Yellow Cab placed it in that extreme position. 1
. A legalistic answer got the Court out of this practical difficulty. The
Yellow Cab case, said the majority, had come up on a motion to dismiss. All
that was before the Court was the sufficiency of the complaint to state a
cause of action. It had been held sufficient because in addition to the allega-
tion of restraint of trade through exclusion of competitors, there was an
allegation of intent to achieve that forbidden end, manifested by a number
of predatory practices. These together made the alleged restraint unreason-
18. The Court rejected the argument that the Associated Press was immunized against
antitrust prosecution by the First Amendment. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). This was under'
scored by the citation of cases from fields as far removed from the realm of free speech as
the bathtub industry. Id. at 18-9.
19. Justice Douglas there remarked that "the majority of the Court does not take [thel]
view" that vertical integration is illegal per se. 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948). He went on to
enumerate factors for determining the legality of a particular vertical integration, such as
intent to gain market control, achievement of the power to exclude competition, the nature
of the market, and leverage on the market made possible by the integration. Ibid.
20. The Government might also have cited the incautious language of International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) : "[it is unreasonable, per se, to fore-
close competitors from any substantial market," citing Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (supra note 17). The Court's overly-generalized statement of the
holding in that case ignores the distinction between two types of exclusion: trade boycott
by an association's members, and restriction of trade by an integrated enterprise to thu
components of that enterprise. The Fashion Originators' Guild case hit at the former type
of exclusion from a market. Nothing that was said in that case supports the view that it
is per se illegal for a company which owns a steel fabricating plant to buy rolled steel ex-
clusively from a mill which it also owns. But that sort of exclusion of competitors seems,
equally with, the trade boycott, "to foreclose competitors from [a] substantial market."'
, .21. A'Nothing in the Yellow Cab case supports the theory that all exclusive dealing
arrangements are illegal per se." 334 U.S. 495, 523 (1948).
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able, and therefore sufficient if proven.2 2 And vertical integration, as such,
was not of itself illegal.
3
On this rock the Government's case foundered. The Court had no diffi-
culty in coming to the conclusion that this vertical integration was not illegal.
As to power, the pre-empting of three per cent of the rolled steel market in
the Consolidated area did not strike the Court as unreasonable. And as to
purpose, the Court did not find the otherwise reasonable restraint tainted
by wicked motives. But in its anxiety to clarify the problem, the Court used
sweeping language which somewhat obscures the role of intent in fixing anti-
trust liability.
The Court, in dealing with the problem of the intent behind this transac-
tion, indulges in what may be a misleading dichotomy. It divides unreason-
able (i.e., illegal) restraints into two classes: those which are unreasonable
per se and those which, while otherwise reasonable, are "accompanied with
a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint." 24 If "illegal per se"
refers only to a few types of conduct such as price-fixing or market division,
then the Court's language, read literally, would seem to undo the work of
Alcoa, American Tobacco, and Griffith, which set up market control-the
mere existence of the power to influence prices or to exclude competitors-as
a criterion of illegality without reference to actual exercise of the power, or
of intent to engage in forbidden conduct. The Court seems to be saying that
market control becomes illegal only upon a showing of specific intent to
restrain trade or monopolize. But this possible interpretation, which would
be a most disturbing feature of the case, was apparently remedied in another
part of the opinion. The Court, in its discussion of the Paramount case,
inferentially rejects this narrow position and reaffirms the central doctrine
of the "new" Sherman Act-that achievement of a prohibited degree of
market control is illegal without a showing of "specific" intent.2 5 And a
general purpose to violate the law will be inferred from the mere existence
of illegal power.
The instant case, however, did not strike the Court as exhibiting an illegal
degree of market control. The percentages of the market preempted by the
vertical and horizontal integrations did not seem to vest in U. S. Steel the
power to exclude competitors or to control prices in the Consolidated market.
Satisfied with the absence of illegal power, the Court turned to the intent
problem and found nothing to make an otherwise reasonable restraint un-
reasonable. The business practices of U. S. Steel could not be called preda-
tory, nor did its motives in purchasing Consolidated appear suspect. This
conclusion stemmed from two factors: the estoppel element involved in the
22. Id. at 522.
23. It was not, apparently, in Yellow Cab. After remand, in a trial on the merits, the
Government lost its taxicab case. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., SO F. Supp. 935 (N.D.
I. 1948).
24. 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
25. Id. at 524-5.
19491
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Geneva transaction, and the peculiar antitrust history of the United States
Steel Corporation.
In determining the absence of specific intent to attempt monopolization,
the Court looked to prior acquisitions by U. S. Steel. It noted that, in the
1920 Steel case,"6 the engorgement of 180 independent concerns had not
made U. S. Steel a violator of Section 2. Subsequent to that case, U. S. Steel
had pulled in its horns and made only 8 acquisitions in the next twenty years.
The Court did not labor the point; 27 but the inference seems clear.
Still more important, the Court focused its attention on the Geneva pur-
chase. Here was the stated purpose of the Consolidated acquisition, and
the Court found itself unable to condemn as illegal the lesser part of a deal
whose greater part the Attorney General had certified as legal. If, in the
Geneva purchase, U. S. Steel did not think it violated the antitrust laws,
how could the acquisition of Consolidated be viewed otherwise than as the
fulfillment of a legitimate business purpose?
Horizontal Integration-The Problem of Prospective Restraint
In considering the legality of the termination of competition between U. S.
and Consolidated in the sale of fabricated steel products, the Court was not
forced to consider vexatious questions of doctrine. Its approach here was
essentially economic.
In this aspect of the case, the market control criteria of the "new" Sher-
man Act stood forth as inapplicable to a merger situation. What had been
talked about in Alcoa, American Tobacco, and Paramount was present, not
prospective, control. The doctrine that market control is a Sherman Act
offense is not too instructive when the problem concerns only one step on
the road to the achievement of the forbidden degree of control.
The Court looked to the existing market situation. It did not find it
possible to say that, as to present competition in structural and pipe fabrica-
tion, the elimination of Consolidated's autonomy was an unreasonable
restraint. But what of the future? What of U. S. Steel's enhanced strategic
position in the expanding West Coast steel market? Too speculative, the
Court firmly replied. And in terms of a view of market control which con-
centrates on the present rather than the prospective degree of power, it is
hard to quarrel with the Court's decision. For aid in merger cases, failing
proof of "specific" intent, the Government would have to look elsewhere.
A New Usefor an Old Statute-The Problem of Clayton Act Section 7
As so frequently seems to occur in antitrust cases, Colunbia Steel's most
fascinating suggestion is hardly more than an aside. At the outset of the
Court's opinion, Justice Reed remarks-in a footnote-that, although this is
a Sherman Act proceeding involving the purchase of the assets rather than
26. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
27. 334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948).
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the stock of a competing concern, the Court will take into account the policy
behind Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which forbids the purchase of the stoch
of a competitor where the result may be a substantial lessening of competi-
tion or a tendency toward the creation of monopoly.2-
The matter-of-fact setting of Justice Reed's remark is belied by its revolu-
tionary implications. For the footnote suggests that the one provision of
antitrust legislation squarely aimed at mergers may finally be given some
effect.
The story of Section 7's judicial emasculation has been told elsewhere.2
Suffice it to say that its intended prophylactic effect has been completely
vitiated by a combination of bad draftsmanship and unsympathetic con-
struction. It has been interpreted to prevent only those mergers effected by
stock purchase; the device of asset acquisition used in the present case has
provided an easy escape, and Section 7 today is little more than a dead
letter.Z Legislative reshaping has seemed the only real answer.31 But Jus-
tice Reed's dictum may change the picture. The policy behind Section 7-
the inhibition of movements toward illegal market control through merger-
may now have a judicial outlet.
The suggestion is all the more fascinating because of its novelty. Never
before in a Sherman Act merger case has it been suggested that the policy of
Section 7 should influence the outcome. More important, the point was not
raised by counsel in this case. It seems to have been the Court's own in-
spiration; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the dissenters would be
even more likely than the majority to support it.
Yet appraisal of the dictum's significance should be ventured only with
great caution. A recent article has enthusiastically suggested that the Court
is going to overrule its established narrow construction of Section 7, thereby
permitting cases to be brought directly under that section .32 But the Court's
recent handling of a parallel problem in United States v. South Buffalo Ry.
Co. 3 forecasts a reluctance to revivify Section 7 itself by overruling previous
28. Id. at 507 n.7.
29. See, for example, the discussion in Comment, 57 YALT LJ. 613 (1943).
30. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926), vacated an order directing Swift
and Co. to divest itself of the acquired stock and property of two competing companies.
The Court held that § 7's inhibition could not be directed against asset acquisition. This
view was pushed to the extreme in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S.
587 (1934), where a merger completed by divestment of the purchased stock was held ble-
yond the reach of § 7 and, consequently, of the FTC.
31. See Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 613 (1948).
32. Zlinkoff and Barnard, Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 97 U. oF PA. L. Rnm.
151, 177 (1948).
33. 333 U.S. 771 (1948). The case involved the Commodities Clause of the Interstate
Commerce Act, which forbids railroads to carry commodities which they "own." The
loophole set up was just the reverse of that which vitiated § 7. Owvnership of assets ,as
forbidden but stock ownership was held to be outside the province of the Commodities
Clause. United States v. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co., 298 U.S. 492 (1936). In the Soutth Buffalo
Ry. case a 5-4 majority said that if the Elgin construction of the Commodities Clause was
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decisions and a probability that the section's established construction will
not be changed unless the Congress acts.
If the dictum means anything-and that is itself problematical-it proba-
bly means that the Court may now be willing to canalize the general anti-
merger policy of Section 7 into its consideration of merger cases under the
Sherman Act. If so, the Government's quantum of proof in merger cases
may be made easier to achieve, since the thrust of Section 7 is prospective:
merger is forbidden where it "may . . . substantially lessen competition
. . . or tend to create a monopoly." [emphasis added]. The modal auxiliary
is all-important. It provides the standard of prospective illegality that has
hitherto been lacking.
Any estimate of the dictum's importance must take account of its failure
to alter the result in Columbia Steel. That it was not decisive may militate
against any positive prediction for its future utility. On the other hand, the
Court may well have viewed the Consolidated merger as too insignificant to
come under the interdiction even of Section 7's'policy, let alone that of the
Sherman Act. Further, the remark, having been made, exists; like other
dicta in antitrust cases, 34 it may grow in importance through continued use.
Certainly the Government would be most remiss not to press for its applica-
tion in future merger cases. Its advocacy will be especially appropriate since
the Court has seemed to pave the way for a reshaping of doctrine by sum-
marily rejecting the citation of old merger precedents."
wrong, it was up to Congress to correct it. Since Congress had not done so, the Court
declined to overrule the Elgin case. The situation seems identical with that of § 7; thus
the Court would probably decline a direct invitation to overrule the interpretation of § 7
expressed in the Western Meat and Arrow-Hart & Hegeaian cases, .tpra note 30.
34. E.g., the famous 90-64-30 dictum in the Alcoa case, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945), supra p. 765.
35. The Court rightly rejected the Government's citation of the railroad merger cases.
334 U.S. 495, 531 n. 27 (1948). Those cases were clearly inapplicable to the present situa-
tion, since they each involved the proposed mergers of two giant railroads. A parallel
situation would be a merger between U.S. Steel and Republic Steel Co. Since these cases
are so completely foreign to the context of the Consolidated purchase, their non-use by
the Court in this case in no way reflects on their continuing vitality as antitrust precedents.
More interesting is the Court's rejection of certain cases cited by the defendants, par-
ticularly the much-criticized cases of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247
U.S. 32 (1918), and United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), See
Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. Rv. 179, 212-24 (1932).
Long considered out of step, with the spirit of the Sherman Act, these cases may now be
headed for desuetude.
Perhaps the Court's most significant rejection is that of International Shoe Co. v. FTC,
280 U.S. 291 (1930), a case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The fact situation there-
absorption by one of the giants in the industry of a small independent manufacturer-seems
closely to approximate that in the Columbia Steel case. By refusing to rely on the case,
even though it reached the same result as the instant case, the Court may be signalizing its
dissatisfaction with the established construction of Section 7 and its willingness to direct
the general policy of the section into its consideration of merger problems.
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